APPEAL
FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Syllabus
Virginia's
statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of
racial classifications held to violate the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 388 U. S. 4-12. reversed.
MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether
a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages
between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 1] For
reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional
commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In
June, 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and
Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant
to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and
established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958,
of the Circuit Court of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment
charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On
January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced to
one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period
of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to
Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:
"Almighty
God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them
on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his arrangement,
there would be no cause for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
After
their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia.
On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the
judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they
had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having
been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting
that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation
statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their
convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to
vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court
continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims
to the highest state court.
The
Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation
statutes and, after modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions. [Footnote 2] The
Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on December
12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.
The
two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial
marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 258 of the Virginia Code:
"Leaving
State to evade law. -- If any white person and colored person shall go out
of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of
returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and
the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in
this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be
evidence of their marriage."
Section
259, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:
"Punishment
for marriage. -- If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or
any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less
than one nor more than five years."
Other
central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which
automatically voids all marriages between "a white person and a colored person" without any
judicial proceeding, [Footnote 3] and
§§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, respectively, define "white persons" and
"colored persons and Indians" for purposes of the statutory
prohibitions. [Footnote 4] The Lovings
have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a
"colored person" or that Mr. Loving is a "white person"
within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.
Virginia is now one of 16 States which
prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications. [Footnote 5] Penalties for miscegenation arose as
an incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial
period. [Footnote 6] The present statutory scheme dates
from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period
of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central
features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of
a "white person" marrying other than another "white
person," [Footnote 7] a prohibition against issuing
marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that the applicants'
statements as to their race are correct, [Footnote 8] certificates of "racial
composition" to be kept by both local and state registrars, [Footnote 9] and the carrying forward of earlier
prohibitions against racial intermarriage. [Footnote 10]
I
In upholding the constitutionality of
these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia referred to its 1965 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87
S.E.2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim,
the state court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were "to
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the
corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and
"the obliteration of racial pride," obviously an endorsement of the
doctrine of White Supremacy. Id. at 90, 87 S.E.2d at 756. The court also
reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation
without federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage
should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.
While the state court is no doubt
correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's
police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in
its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are
unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could
it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U. S. 535 (1942). Instead, the State argues that
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of
the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element as
part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes
in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree. Thus,
the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both
the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these
statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute
an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced by
the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is
that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes
because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of
constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a
State to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages. On this
question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt
and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state
legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.
Because we reject the notion that the
mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not
accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is
any possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere
fact of equal application does not mean that our analysis of these statutes
should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no racial
discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been arrayed against a
statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be displayed
on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949), or an exemption in Ohio's ad
valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving
distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether
there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to
the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with
statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which
the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn
according to race.
The State argues that statements in the
Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
indicate that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional
state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State
concern the debates over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which President Johnson
vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto.
While these statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in
submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that they pertained
to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the broader, organic purpose of
a constitutional amendment. As for the various statements directly concerning
the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem
that, although these historical sources "cast some light" they are
not sufficient to resolve the problem; "[a]t best, they are inconclusive.
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them
to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the
United States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both
the letter and the spirit of the Amendments, and wished them to have the most
limited effect."
Brown v. Board of Education v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 310 (1880). We have rejected the
proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state
legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory
advanced by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is
satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial classifications so
long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964).
The State finds support for its
"equal application" theory in the decision of the Court in Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U. S. 583 (1883). In that case, the Court upheld
a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication
between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater penalty than that of
a statute proscribing similar conduct by members of the same race. The Court
reasoned that the statute could not be said to discriminate against Negroes
because the punishment for each participant in the offense was the same. However,
as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning of that case, we
stated "Pace represents a limited view of the Equal Protection
Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this
Court." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 379 U. S. 188. As we there demonstrated, the Equal
Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications
drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The
clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 71 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 307-308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 100 U. S. 334-335 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U. S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).
There can be no question but that
Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according
to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by
members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently
repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U. S. 81, 320 U. S. 100 (1943). At the very least, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 323 U. S. 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be
upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this
Court have already stated that they "cannot conceive of a valid
legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of
whether his conduct is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 379 U. S. 198
(STEWART, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J.,
concurring).
There is patently no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which
justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy. [Footnote 11] We have consistently denied the
constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account
of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.
II
These statutes also deprive the Lovings
of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Marriage is one of the "basic
civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill,
125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot
be infringed by the State.
These convictions must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides:
"All persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 257 of the Virginia Code
provides:
"Marriages void without decree.
-- All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be
absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process."
Va.Code Ann. § 20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code
provides:
"Intermarriage prohibited;
meaning of term 'white persons.' -- It shall hereafter be unlawful for any
white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with
no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of
this chapter, the term 'white person' shall apply only to such person as has no
trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have
one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other
non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore
passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored
persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter." Va.Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
The exception for persons with less
than one-sixteenth "of the blood of the American Indian" is
apparently accounted for, in the words of a tract issued by the Registrar of
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, by "the desire of all to recognize
as an integral and honored part of the white race the descendants of John Rolfe
and Pocathontas. . . ." Plecker, The New Family and Race Improvement, 17
Va.Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at 25-26 (New Family Series No. 5, 1925), cited
in Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 Va.L.Rev. 1189, 1202, n. 93 (1966).
Section 1-14 of the Virginia Code
provides:
"Colored persons and Indians
defined. -- Every person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood
shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be
deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing in
this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one
sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians."
Va.Code Ann. § 1-14 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
After the initiation of this
litigation, Maryland repealed its prohibitions against interracial marriage,
Md.Laws 1967, c. 6, leaving Virginia and 15 other States with statutes
outlawing interracial marriage: Alabama, Ala.Const., Art. 4, § 102, Ala.Code,
Tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware,
Del.Code Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Florida, Fla.Const., Art. 16, § 24,
Fla.Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia, Ga.Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Kentucky,
Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966); Louisiana, La.Rev.Stat. § 14:79
(1950); Mississippi, Miss.Const., Art. 14, § 263, Miss.Code Ann. § 459 (1956);
Missouri, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North Carolina, N.C.Const., Art.
XIV, § 8, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma, Okla.Stat., Tit. 43, § 12
(Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S.C.Const., Art. 3, § 33, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7
(1962); Tennessee, Tenn.Const., Art. 11, § 14, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955);
Texas, Tex.Pen.Code, Art. 492 (1952); West Virginia, W.Va.Code Ann. § 4697
(1961).
Over the past 15 years, 14 States have
repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
The first state court to recognize that
miscegenation statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause was the Supreme
Court of California. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
For a historical discussion of
Virginia's miscegenation statutes, see Wadlington, supra, n 4.
Appellants
point out that the State's concern in these statutes, as expressed in the words
of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity,"
extends only to the integrity of the white race. While Virginia prohibits
whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the exception for the descendants
of Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may intermarry
without statutory interference. Appellants contend that this distinction
renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes arbitrary and unreasonable even
assuming the constitutional validity of an official purpose to preserve
"racial integrity." We need not reach this contention, because we
find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the
"integrity" of all races.
MR.
JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
I
have previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not possible for a
state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an
act depend upon the race of the actor." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 379 U. S. 198 (concurring opinion).
Because I adhere to that belief, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
