1 – Discuss the impacts of the ratification debate on the political and social climates. Why are these impacts important to consider in relation to the EQ?
2 – What’s the difference between federal and national government? Why did some opponents to the Constitution take issue with being called “Antifederalists?”
3 – Discuss the Antifederalist critique of the Constitution. What was their issue w the document?
4 – Primary Source analysis: Antifederalist Papers: Brutus #1 (see below)
When the public is called to
investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of
the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of
generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the benevolent mind
cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested in the result....
Perhaps this country never saw so
critical a period in their political concerns. We have felt the feebleness of
the ties by which these United-States are held together, and the want of
sufficient energy in our present confederation, to manage, in some instances,
our general concerns. Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these
evils, but none have succeeded. At length a Convention of the states has been
assembled, they have formed a constitution which will now, probably, be
submitted to the people to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power,
to whom alone it of right belongs to make or unmake constitutions, or forms of
government, at their pleasure. The most important question that was ever
proposed to your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is
before you, and you are to decide upon it by men of your own election, chosen
specially for this purpose. If the constitution, offered to your acceptance, be
a wise one, calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of liberty, to
secure the inestimable rights of mankind, and promote human happiness, then, if
you accept it, you will lay a lasting foundation of happiness for millions yet
unborn; generations to come will rise up and call you blessed. You may rejoice
in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming filled with freemen,
who will assert the dignity of human nature. You may solace yourselves with the
idea, that society, in this favoured land, will fast advance to the highest
point of perfection; the human mind will expand in knowledge and virtue, and
the golden age be, in some measure, realised. But if, on the other hand, this
form of government contains principles that will lead to the subversion of
liberty — if it tends to establish a despotism, or, what is worse, a tyrannic
aristocracy; then, if you adopt it, this only remaining assylum for liberty
will be shut up, and posterity will execrate your memory.
Momentous then is
the question you have to determine, and you are called upon by every motive
which should influence a noble and virtuous mind, to examine it well, and to
make up a wise judgment. It is insisted, indeed, that this constitution must be
received, be it ever so imperfect. If it has its defects, it is said, they can
be best amended when they are experienced. But remember, when the people once
part with power, they can seldom or never resume it again but by force. Many
instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily increased the
powers of their rulers; but few, if any, in which rulers have willingly
abridged their authority. This is a sufficient reason to induce you to be
careful, in the first instance, how you deposit the powers of government.
With these few introductory remarks,
I shall proceed to a consideration of this constitution:
The first question that presents
itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the best for the
United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States
should be reduced to one great republic, governed by one legislature, and under
the direction of one executive and judicial; or whether they should continue
thirteen confederated republics, under the direction and controul of a supreme
federal head for certain defined national purposes only?
This enquiry is important, because,
although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and
entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if
executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.
This government is to possess
absolute and uncontroulable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with
respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is
declared "that the Congress shall
have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
constitution, in the government of the United States; or in any department or
office thereof." And by the 6th
article, it is declared "that
this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution, or
law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It appears from
these articles that there is no need of any intervention of the state
governments, between the Congress and the people, to execute any one power
vested in the general government, and that the constitution and laws of every
state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be
inconsistent with this constitution, or the laws made in pursuance of it, or
with treaties made under the authority of the United States. — The government
then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as
much one complete government as that of New-York or Massachusetts, has as
absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to appoint officers,
institute courts, declare offences, and annex penalties, with respect to every
object to which it extends, as any other in the world. So far therefore as its
powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost. It is true this
government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small
degree of power is still left to the states, but a little attention to the
powers vested in the general government, will convince every candid man, that
if it is capable of being executed, all that is reserved for the individual
states must very soon be annihilated, except so far as they are barely
necessary to the organization of the general government. The powers of the
general legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance —
there is nothing valuable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is
within its power. It has authority to make laws which will affect the lives,
the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the
constitution or laws of any state, in any way prevent or impede the full and
complete execution of every power given. The legislative power is competent to
lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; — there is no limitation to this
power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which those
taxes, and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation: but this is
no restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are to be applied
to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States; but the legislature have authority to contract debts at their
discretion; they are the sole judges of what is necessary to provide for the
common defence, and they only are to determine what is for the general welfare;
this power therefore is neither more nor less, than a power to lay and collect
taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure; not only [is] the power to lay
taxes unlimited, as to the amount they may require, but it is perfect and
absolute to raise them in any mode they please. No state legislature, or any
power in the state governments, have any more to do in carrying this into
effect, than the authority of one state has to do with that of another. In the
business therefore of laying and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is
totally lost, and that of one entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to
remark, that the authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of
any power that can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or
at least will in process of time draw all other after it; it is the great mean
of protection, security, and defence, in a good government, and the great
engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the
case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this constitution,
to the late [state?] governments, on this article of raising money. No state
can emit paper money — lay any duties, or imposts, on imports, or exports, but
by consent of the Congress; and then the net produce shall be for the benefit
of the United States: the only mean therefore left, for any state to support
its government and discharge its debts, is by direct taxation; and the United
States have also power to lay and collect taxes, in any way they please. Every
one who has thought on the subject, must be convinced that but small sums of
money can be collected in any country, by direct taxe[s], when the foederal
government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the
legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to
support their governments. Without money they cannot be supported, and they
must dwindle away, and, as before observed, their powers absorbed in that of
the general government.
It might be here shewn, that the
power in the federal legislative, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as
well in peace as in war, and their controul over the militia, tend, not only to
a consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty. — I shall
not, however, dwell upon these, as a few observations upon the judicial power
of this government, in addition to the preceding, will fully evince the truth
of the position.
